A systems engineering process model for the acquisition of large, complex systems for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is being adapted for ongoing experiments in acquisition process policies. The discrete-event simulation model of the larger "enterprise of acquisition" for weapon systems has a broad scope from program beginning through development. It reveals some of the challenges and risks in weapon system acquisition.
INTRODUCTION
This research is for the assessment and improvement of a systems acquisition process performed at the defense enterprise level. We are using modeling and simulation to gain system understanding and evaluate improvement options. The system-of-interest is the socio-technical acquisition system covering activities of many contractors and agencies. Subsumed within these organizations are the detailed, traditional systems and software engineering processes conducted for respective system portions.
The Wirthlin Acquisition model [1] being used is a process model for systems engineering performed in the very large. It takes the highest-level view of managing all development processes within the acquisition system supply chain enterprise. It models systems engineering activities in the socio-technical acquisition lifecycle as-is, and we are extending it to look at process alternatives.
Through this modeling approach, insights into the measurement and evaluation of large enterprises are possible. For instance, if DoD Acquisition is in constant state of "reform" or "transformation," how should it be measured? How could changes be evaluated?
How should system behaviors be represented? The model provides new ways to analyze the large, complex enterprise.
The process outputs of cost, schedule, and performance are usually used to measure overall system outcomes. Modeling and simulation can answer such questions as "How long did a program take to get through the system?" and "What is the likelihood any system will complete development and be ready for large-scale production?"
The next sections overview the acquisition process, how the model was produced, what was learned from it, and how others can apply it, including our current and future work.
BACKGROUND
On many programs local systems and software processes are to be integrated within a larger enterprise process. System acquisition processes undertaken by large governmental agencies exemplify such extremely large, encompassing, complex enterprise processes. The U.S. defense enterprise acquisition system is a classic example of the interplay among elements in a very complex socio-technical system. Such a system often confounds efforts to contain cost and schedule growth. For example, U.S. DoD programs averaged about 40% schedule growth and approximately 50% cost growth [2] . From an enterprise perspective, since the 1970s, total budget overruns for DoD system development of at least 30% have been the norm and are increasing [3] .
Since development programs may require decades to transit the existing process from beginning to end, and the process is constantly being changed and adapted, without a model there is great difficulty conducting longitudinal analyses that reflect the actual state of the system at any given time.
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The Acquisition System
Between policy choices and statutory requirements, the DoD has developed a number of processes and organizations for systems acquisition. The structure and appearance of the organizations responsible to acquire new systems have only grown more complicated through the years.
Within the DoD, there are three key processes that interact with one another in weapon systems development. Together, these are coined as the Big "A" of Acquisition. The first of these processes is the manner by which the end-user or the war fighter determines requirements that need to be fulfilled as a product of the acquisition system called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) [4] . The other major systems are the Programming, Planning, and Budget Execution (PPBE) process and the Acquisition process. A miniaturized version of the Defense Acquisition System "Wall Chart" (December 2008 version) in Figure 1 illustrates the overall process. There are three primary milestones shown for Milestones A, B and C in the acquisition lifecycle (MS A, MS B, MS C).
Furthermore, the acquisition system categorizes programs using a series of Acquisition categories (ACAT). ACAT I programs are typically the largest or the most politically sensitive. ACAT II programs typically are software intensive and have special requirements. ACAT III programs don't qualify in either of the other ACAT categories and are usually much less money and less politically sensitive. These are all known as "Programs of Record." There are a handful of ACAT I programs, a few more ACAT II programs and many more ACAT III programs in existence at any given time. Additionally, programs that don't meet any of the criteria defining ACATs exist which are monetarily miniscule in comparison to other programs. 
Previous Simulation Work
The few previous simulation models that explored acquisition level processes are overviewed in [5] . Most of them were continuous systems models with smaller focuses or sub-domains, and not at the full DoD enterprise level.
An integrated acquisition, systems and software process model would involve modeling overall system feasibility as well as process development considerations (e.g. cost, schedule, quality). The SAMSA virtual acquisition process in [6] incorporated system dynamics for project modeling. The dynamics of the relationship between prime contractor and government program office during research and development for aircraft acquisition was investigated in [7] . In the automobile domain, a system dynamics model framework for a software supplier acquisition process was described in [8] .
The acquisition process for a large-scale government system at The Aerospace Corporation was the focus in [9] to better understand the software-intensive system acquisition process. A case-study approach was used to explore the dynamics of "disconnects" in baselines across multiple organizations in a large software-intensive space system development program.
The system dynamics model was of communication effectiveness and delay across four organizations that sequentially and iteratively relied on each other for requirements and deliverables. It suggested the highest points of leverage in reducing disconnects are increasing expertise levels, improving communication clarity, and accelerating change impact assessment across organizations. These results may oppose traditional assumptions that disconnects are due to external requirements changes and that speeding up organizational processes will reduce disconnects.
MODEL OVERVIEW
The model has a larger lifecycle scope than the previous studies that stretches from Pre-MS A activities to MS C. It includes five communities: User, Requirements function (e.g. JCIDS), the PPBE system, Acquisition system, and Prime Contractors. It is the first to model the big "A" of Acquisition at a high level of abstraction.
It combines the "official" process flow with observed realities and validated observations of the probabilities and time required with the different steps. It uses value stream mapping techniques to form the basis of the model. The model's primary entity represents a program with attributes that include ACAT level. The entity flows through the acquisition process and may exit the process without successful completion at any of 22 points, or may successfully complete the process at MS C. The model, programmed in Rockwell Automation's Arena simulation software [10] , is run many times (usually thousands or tens of thousands) to obtain probability of successful completion and a distribution of total time through the process.
The model scope within the overall acquisition system is in Figure  2 , showing it organized around swim lanes. Each lane consists of a functional process and organizational arrangement. The horizontal axis serves as a loose representation of time. The first User swim lane is the source of many different ideas, concepts, and formal direction given to various system development questions.
Figure 2: Model scope within overall acquisition system
The model's flow diagram in Figure 3 has characteristics of the "wall chart" in Figure 1 . It shows the big "A" of Acquisition consists of three large interacting processes divided along functional lines, and along a temporal scale. The system is huge in scale and scope, but the primary focus is the acquisition of weapon systems, so the sustainment phase is excluded. The production phase (post MS-C) was excluded because most costs for the design and development have already been incurred. 
Process Elicitation
Initially written materials were used as sources about the acquisition system including official documentation, books, and journal articles. Later this was expanded to include the requirements and funding portions of the system. Two studies were then undertaken to better understand the acquisition system. The first focused on acquisition professionals, and the second built upon the initial findings and interviewed personnel in the other two systems. From these a model was developed that captured the findings and frame the problem.
During the second study, each interviewee was asked about different outcome measures of their task: How long did it take to do their job? They abstracted answers into a time range or a time distribution. These probabilities on decisions and key process checkpoints were used to fill in the gaps from the official source document idealized process flows.
Typical uncertainties on the time duration of a given task in days allowed the use of triangular or binomial distributions. The time elapsed for a program is then simply the cumulative value of the number of days required to go through the overall system.
Empirical Data
Empirical data sources used include DAMIR (Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval) data access, SMART (System Metric and Reporting Tool) data, MAR scores (all programs of record; some since 1990s), PoPS scores (all programs of record since 2006), SAR data, APBs, Air Force Financial data and library access, PEM assignments; PE to program mapping; P & R documents, PEO system groupings; ACAT levels for programs; OSD Acquisition Management data access, all PMDs since 1989, SACOM data access, Acquisition manning data and expert interviews. The full acronyms and details for all these sources are in [1] .
MODEL USAGE AND RESULTS
The goal of the simulation studies was to gain system understanding and evaluate improvement options. Some key questions relating to these are: "How does the model respond to interventions patterned after some of the proposed changes to the overall system?" "Will there be any improvement in the total time required for a program to arrive at MS C?" "Will there be any improvement in overall process quality?" Experimental interventions were then undertaken to answer these questions. Twenty different interventions were evaluated. One example is described next.
Air Staff Intervention: This intervention explores what will happen with the model outcomes if the process step "Air Staff" is minimized. This will see how the model reacts if a component is eliminated from the system or what would happen if a step on the "critical path" of this swim lane is removed. The "Air Staff" process step refers to the process where the Air Staff coordinates the review of a given JCIDS document between the other services and also different MAJCOMs.
Simulation results indicated this intervention did not substantively reduce or change the outcomes. While initially surprising, the location, purpose and duration of this process in the overall enterprise effort was a very small piece compared to the totality of the acquisition process.
Many interesting patterns emerged from the experiments with selected interventions [1] , [11] . One example result shows the greatest impacts on the mean outcome by intervention type, in order of impact compared to baseline 1.0 (value / percent reduction): Data was collected at various points with an experimental sample of 48500 simulated programs. The results show the vast majority of programs never make it into the formal system. Between being rejected outright or rejected after a small "socialization" period, 62% of all attempts end in this manner. Further analysis shows half of the remaining programs get diverted into existing acquisition programs where they will be accomplished as part of another system's sustainment process.
Finally, nearly ¾ of all programs that formally enter the Acquisition system comprised of JCIDS, PPBE, and acquisition, arrive at MS C. The model suggests that while the initial entry barrier is high, once into the system, the likelihood of eventually reaching MS C is very high.
Once a system "enters" the formal acquisition system, it has a better than even chance of making it to MS C. A program's best chance for success is to enter somewhere other than the "beginning" of the formal system. Chances increase from about a 60% success rate for a program entering at the beginning to more than 85% for programs entering the formal system elsewhere along the line. These results are in Figure 6 . 
Verification and Validation
Data was tabulated from open-source, Air Force, and Government information regarding program performance in terms of cost and schedule of multiple programs at various ACAT Levels. This was a separate, independent look at data sources to validate the model's outcomes rather than rely upon GAO reports. Statistical testing used 164 programs of record.
For the model we used 10000 data samples for completing Milestone C with no deviations from the "normal" process, e.g. MS A to MS B to MS C, etc., against actual program data.
The null hypothesis H0 is that the mean difference between the samples is zero. Since the t-statistic < t critical (1.20 < 2.09) and p value > alpha (0.24 > 0.05), the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 95% confidence level.
Similar results restricted to specific program attributes, e.g. ACAT I model samples vs. ACAT I actual program results, yielded similar results. The null hypothesis was not rejected at the 95% confidence level for any of these more specific comparisons.
Across all breakdowns of data, there is a high degree of confidence that the mean difference between the data is zero. This analysis was also done excluding those programs that had not yet reached MS C. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the means of the two samples (model results vs. actual program data) are the same between MS B and MS C at a 95% confidence level [1] .
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORK
We are studying alternative acquisition processes, the DoD 5000.02 policy for the defense acquisition system [12] , analyzing empirical program data, and providing support tools for acquisition planning. Initially this research used the US Air Force processes as representative to illustrate the system capabilities and challenges. It is more general and can be used for all the services.
In the current team collaboration we are using simulation environments and tools at NPS to support the model translation from Arena to ExtendSim [13] . These tools are helping in our understanding of the current model. We are also prototyping webbased versions for open public access.
At The Aerospace Corporation, the algorithms are being replicated in an ExtendSim model. This translation will be our basis for further experiments and extensions.
Example planned extensions include a model predictive option, domain tailorability, adding risk and cost measures, explicit modeling of the PPBE process, and evaluating other DoD process options like the Incremental Commitment Model [14] (e.g. it provides risk-driven guidance for killing projects).
We have completed the model translation, other acquisition stakeholders are seeing value in the model and are putting more resources into the translation effort.
We can describe our future study plans with an historical analogy in software process modeling. The Abdel-Hamid project model [15] spawned multiple lines of investigation for software development, from deeper looks at the process, considering other outcomes such as quality, and specialized models. We envision that the Wirthlin model can do the same for DoD acquisition modeling.
Our intent is that the acquisition model translations and extensions will be available to collaborators and the public. The current translation with ExtendSim will be the basis, the initial results are imminent and can be reported shortly.
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